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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WAYNE S. TIPPETT,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Case No. 990178-CA

vs.
Priority No. 3
FRED VANDERVEUR,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his request for post-conviction
relief. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Whether petitioner may make a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in a
proceeding in which no Constitutional right to counsel existed. No standard of review
applies to this issue.
2. (a) Whether the trial court correctly found that no conflict of interest existed
between petitioner and his appellate counsel.
(b) Whether the trial court correctly found that petitioner's appellate counsel was
not ineffective in briefing the issues raised in petitioner's prior appeal.

For both of these claims, involving issues of both fact and law, the following
standard of review applies:
Our standard of review for an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for
post-conviction relief depends on the issue appealed. Though we review
the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, we will disturb
findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Further, "'we survey
the record in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and
we will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the
trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted.'"
Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, attached as Addendum D
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 29, 1997, petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
relief (R.24). The petition was dismissed as frivolous by the trial court on October 2,
1997 (R.38). Petitioner appealed (R.42). The Utah Supreme Court summarily
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the petition, remanding for further proceedings
and directing the trial court to appoint new counsel for petitioner (R.62). On remand,
the trial court dismissed all of petitioner's claims as procedurally barred except for his
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (R. 101). Following an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied the remainder of the petition, and petitioner timely
appealed (R.622).
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After petitioner's opening brief had been filed, the case was remanded to the
trial court for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law on September 22, 1999 (R.735). By Notice
dated November 12, 1999, petitioner's counsel informed this Court that no amended
brief would be filed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 18, 1986, Petitioner was charged with two counts of aggravated
kidnaping, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp.
1986) (R.617).1 Each charge included a firearm enhancement pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1986). At his circuit court arraignment, petitioner pled guilty
to one count of aggravated kidnaping with the use of a firearm, and the second count
was dismissed (R.616). Petitioner was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life,
along with a consecutive term of five to ten years for the firearm enhancement (R.616).
Petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea. On June 30, 1994, more than eight
years after being sentenced, petitioner filed a pre? se motion to withdraw his guilty plea

1

Most record citations in the Statement of Facts are to the State's Memorandum
in Opposition to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (attached as Addendum A). In
making its findings of fact, the trial court explicitly adopted the facts as stated in this
memorandum: "In addition to the specific findings made and entered by the Court, the
Court will incorporate the factual basis and references to the transcript found in the
State's Memoranda . . . . The State's Memoranda is incorporated by reference in its
entirety." September 22, 1999 Ruling, Finding of Fact #7 (R.736) (attached as
Addendum B).
3

(R.616). The trial court denied most of the motion summarily, but sought a written
response from the State on the sole issue of whether the sentencing court imposed a
different firearm enhancement penalty than was explained to petitioner when he entered
his plea. On July 12, 1994, the trial court entered a supplemental ruling denying
petitioner's motion as it related to the firearm enhancement (R.616).
Appeal from denial of the motion to withdraw plea. Petitioner appealed the
trial court's denial of his motion, and filed a request for appointment of counsel. The
Utah Supreme Court remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination of
petitioner's entitlement to appointed counsel, and the trial court appointed Alan
Williams to represent petitioner on appeal (R.615).
On January 20, 1995, Mr. Williams filed petitioner's opening brief, arguing
that the trial court failed to comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in
accepting petitioner's guilty plea (R.615). On June 5, 1995, petitioner filed zpro se
motion for substitution of counsel, along with a supporting memorandum and affidavit.
Petitioner also filed a pro se motion for leave to file an amended or supplemental brief.
On June 21, 1995, the court of appeals denied petitioner's motion for supplemental
briefing and remanded the matter to the trial court for disposition of petitioner's request
for substitution of counsel (R.615).
On August 31, 1995, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for substitution of
counsel. Petitioner then filed a pro se "Motion for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
4

Determination and to Withdrawal of Appeal Brier in the court of appeals. The court
of appeals granted petitioner permission to file a/?ra se supplemental brief, and then
denied as moot petitioner's motions regarding ineffective counsel and withdrawal of
Mr. Williams' brief (R.614).
The trial court reconsidered its ruling regarding new counsel, and on October
13, 1995, directed the court administrator's office to select defense counsel from the
Salt Lake Area. The court of appeals stayed petitioner's appeal pending the
appointment of new counsel. On January 11, 1996, the trial court reinstated its August
31, 1995 order denying petitioner's motion for substitution of counsel and rescinded its
October 13, 1995 order appointing a lawyer from Salt Lake (R.614).
On March 20, 1996, in response to petitioner's pro se motion for extension of
time to file a supplemental brief, the court of appeals ordered that all future filings on
petitioner's behalf must be submitted by his appointed counsel, Mr. Williams. On
April 1, 1996, Mr. Williams filed a new appellate brief raising the following issues in
addition to the Rule 11 issues raised in the prior brief: (1) the charging information did
not adequately inform petitioner of the nature of the charges because it did not
specifically identify the victims; (2) petitioner's ineffective trial counsel impaired
petitioner's ability to comprehend the plea proceeding in that counsel failed to request
discovery or a bill of particulars, failed to explain to petitioner the elements of the
offenses and the nature of the firearm enhancement, and did not assist the court in
5

establishing a factual basis for the plea; and (3) trial counsel failed to appeal
immediately after sentencing (R.613) (Addendum C).
On October 3, 1996, the court of appeals issued a memorandum decision
modifying petitioner's sentence and affirming the trial court's denial of petitioner's
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R.612) (Addendum A). The court specifically
addressed petitioner's claim that the trial court failed to inform him of the maximum
additional sentence for the firearm enhancement, finding that the trial court incorrectly
informed petitioner that the maximum sentence for the enhancement was one-to-five
years. Accordingly, the court of appeals modified petitioner's sentence for the firearm
enhancement to one-to-five years. Id. The court acknowledged that petitioner raised
other arguments, but found them to be without merit and declined to address them
individually. Id. atn. 1.
The relationship between petitioner and appellate counsel. The trial court in
this case found that no conflict existed between petitioner and his appellate counsel,
Alan Williams (R.736). The only possible evidence that Mr. Williams had time
pressures that might interfere with his ability to represent petitioner was his
acknowledgment that the trip from his home in Vernal to the prison at Gunnison was
"somewhat burdensome." The court found that this evidence insufficient to support a
finding that a conflict of interest existed. Id. Further, the court found that Mr.
Williams effectively communicated with petitioner and responded to petitioner's
6

requests in a manner fully consistent with the standards of practice for criminal
appellate attorneys. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was
properly denied by the trial court because petitioner did not have a constitutional right
to counsel for purposes of appealing the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is filed after sentencing, the
motion should be considered as a petition for post-conviction relief for purposes of
determining whether a right to counsel exists, and there is no right to counsel for
purposes of seeking post-conviction relief. Courts have consistently held that there is
no constitutional right to counsel in seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing
and when no evidentiary hearing is held. Since petitioner had no constitutional right to
counsel in pursuing his motion to withdraw his plea, he cannot now make a claim that
he was denied a constitutional right because his counsel was ineffective.
Point II. Petitioner's claim that his counsel had a conflict of interest fails
because it is unsupported by the record and contradicted by the trial court's findings of
fact. Petitioner does not challenge the trial court's findings, which are supported by the
testimony in the record.

7

Point III. Petitioner has failed to show that his appellate counsel performed
inadequately. Appellate counsel argued the most significant issues on appeal, and
obtained a reduction in petitioner's sentence.
In addition, petitioner has failed to show that any of the issues he asserts were
omitted by his counsel would have been successful. Petitioner has not shown that any
alleged mistakes by his trial counsel occurred, or that these alleged errors affected his
decision to plead guilty. Petitioner has not shown that there was a jurisdictional defect
in the information. The record does not support petitioner's argument that the trial
court failed to accurately describe the effect of the firearm enhancement at the plea
hearing, or that there was no factual basis for his plea.
There is likewise no record to support petitioner's assertion that his counsel
violated the rules of professional conduct, which do not require that criminal appellate
counsel raise every issue identified by the client. Petitioner has also failed to articulate
any proper grounds for seeking a rehearing from the court of appeals, and therefore has
failed to show that counsel was inadequate for failure to file a rehearing petition.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER HAD NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
FOR HIS APPEAL FROM THE COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA, AND
THEREFORE HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM FOR
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal
from his motion to withdraw his guilty plea due to an alleged conflict of interest and
failure to properly brief issues on appeal. Brief of Appellant, p. 11. This claim fails
because it is premised upon a false assumption: that he had a constitutional right to an
attorney in appealing from the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Unless petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel in appealing the court's
denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, he cannot make a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Wainright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (in
proceedings where no constitutional right to counsel exists, defendant had no claim
denial of effective assistance of counsel); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 752 (1991) (deficient performance of counsel in post-conviction review case does
not excuse procedural default of claims since no right to counsel exists).
In fact, there is no constitutional right to counsel for purposes of a postsentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea. There is a constitutional right to
representation by an attorney in only limited circumstances, such as a criminal trial and
9

a first appeal. See Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 877 (Utah 1990) ("The constitutionally
guaranteed right to counsel encompasses the right to the effective assistance of counsel
both at trial and on the first direct appeal of right") {citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.
387 (1985)); See also Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 530 (Utah 1994) (no
constitutional right to counsel for defendants seeking post-conviction relief); Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (right to counsel in parole revocation proceedings
dependent upon nature of issues raised).
In contrast, courts have consistently held that there is no constitutional right to
counsel for purposes of filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea following sentencing
and any initial appeal. For example, in Dankert v. Wharton, 733 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir.
1984), after a defendant had been sentenced in state court, he sought appointment of
counsel in order to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. When this request was
denied, he filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court claiming that he had been
denied the assistance of counsel in pursuing his motion. On appeal from the district
court's denial of his petition, the court noted that "this court has long held that the state
need not appoint counsel for indigent defendants in post-conviction and collateral
proceedings." The court then considered the nature of a post-sentencing motion to
withdraw a plea, and held that "[b]y analogy to the cases holding that there is no right
to counsel in post-conviction and collateral proceedings, we hold that Dankert had no
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absolute right to counsel at the post-conviction, discretionary plea withdrawal
proceeding." Id. at 1538.
Similarly, in State v. Watts, 565 N.E.2d 1282 (Ohio App. 1989), a defendant
sought to withdraw his plea several years after his sentencing. His motion for
appointment of counsel was denied, and the appellate court affirmed this denial. The
court held that there is no right to counsel for purposes of a post-sentencing motion to
withdraw a plea, which is analogous to collateral attack or discretionary appeal. Id. at
1283. Accordingly, a long-delayed motion to withdraw a guilty plea such as the one
filed by petitioner in this case, more than eight years after his sentencing, should
considered a post-conviction proceeding for purposes of determining whether a right to
counsel exists.
Current Utah law governing motions to withdraw a plea strongly supports the
Dankert court's equating of a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a plea and a postconviction petition for purposes of determining the existence of a right to counsel.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999) provides that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
must be made within 30 days.2 Under this current rule, petitioner could only have

2

Since petitioner's guilty plea was entered three years prior to the enactment of
§ 77-13-6 in 1989, defendant was not informed of the thirty day time limit. Failure to
inform a defendant of the time limit may constitute grounds for extending the time limit
to file a motion to withdraw, and the trial court's ability to entertain petitioner's motion
was never challenged. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f); State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 582
(Utah App. 1992).
11

challenged his plea and conviction by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 65B, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, providing for post-conviction motions for which no right to counsel
exists. See Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Utah 1996) ("'neither the Due
Process Clause nor the equal protection guarantee of meaningful access requires a state
to provide counsel for indigent defendants seeking post-conviction relief/") {quoting
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 530 (Utah 1994). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e)
(providing that a motion to withdraw a plea may only be made prior to sentencing; after
that, a defendant must file a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Since
petitioner could not have even filed his motion under current law, and would not have
been entitled to appointment of counsel in filing a post-conviction proceeding raising
the same issues, it cannot be said that his right to file this motion is so fundamental that
appointment of counsel is constitutionally required. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551, 555-57 (1987) ("States have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief,
and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does
not require that the State supply a lawyer as weir).
Although some courts have found that there is a right to counsel for purposes of
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, such rulings have been expressly limited to those
cases in which an evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of the motion, and the
motion is filed prior to sentencing or prior to the time for filing a notice of appeal from
the original conviction, such that the issues raised by the motion would be addressed in
12

that first appeal. State v. Harell, 911 P.2d 1034, 1035 (Wash. App. 1996) (right to
counsel was triggered by trial court's unchallenged decision to hold a hearing on
motion to withdraw plea); Padgett v. State, 743 So.2d 70, 73 (Fla. App. 1999) (right to
counsel exists for motion to withdraw plea filed prior to time for appeal because, under
state law, the plea withdrawal issues would be addressed during the direct appeal);
Berry v. State, 630 So.2d 127, 129 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (defendant has a right to
counsel at a hearing on his motion to withdraw a plea filed between sentencing and
appeal: "if an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel
at sentencing and in the first appeal as a matter of right, that defendant would be
entitled to the assistance of counsel in the interim period, absent a waiver.") (quoting
King v. State, 613 So.2d 888, 891 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
Accordingly, since petitioner had no constitutional right to counsel for purposes
of filing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea or his appeal from the trial court's
denial of his motion, he has no grounds for asserting that his appellate counsel's
allegedly defective performance deprived him of any constitutional right. Wainwright
v. Torna, 455 U.S. at 587-88. The trial court's dismissal of this case should be
affirmed on this basis alone.3

3

Although this argument was not asserted in the court below, the trial court's
dismissal of the petition may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record. See
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1996).
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT NO CONFLICT OF
INTEREST EXISTED BETWEEN PETITIONER AND HIS
COUNSEL, AND PETITIONER DOES NOT CHALLENGE THIS
FINDING OF FACT
Assuming arguendo that petitioner had a constitutional right to representation of
counsel on appeal from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, he would have
had the right to representation by conflict-free counsel. State v. Lovell, 984 P.2d 382
(Utah 1999). Defendant claims that his appellate attorney, Alan Williams, had a
conflict of interest which deprived him of his right to counsel. Brief of Appellant,
pp. 12-19. In order to show this right was violated, petitioner "must establish both that
[Williams] had an actual conflict of interest, and that the conflict adversely affected
[Williams'] performance. To establish an actual conflict of interest, [petitioner] must
show that [Williams] had to make choices that would advance his own interests to the
detriment of [petitioner's]." Id. at 387 (citing State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah
1997)).
Petitioner claims that his attorney had a conflict of interest based upon State v.
Taylor, 947 P.2d at 687. In Taylor, the Supreme Court considered a defendant's claim
that a conflict of interest existed because his attorney's financial interests conflicted
with the attorney's ability to represent him. Id. Denying the claim, the Court held that
"Taylor did not introduce any evidence regarding other demands on [his attorney's]

14

time or point to inadequacies in the time spent on this case. Without this information,
we must accept the lower court's assessment that [the attorney's] income and resources
did not affect his strategy and efforts in this case." Id.
In this case, the trial court denied petitioner's claim that Williams had a conflict
of interest due to time or financial conflicts, finding that petitioner failed to meet his
burden of showing the existence of a conflict. "The Court has not been able to deduce
from the transcript or any testimony contained therein any apparent conflict of interest.
The only suggestion that there was a conflict would be Mr. Williams' statement that the
trip from Vernal to Gunnison was extremely long and somewhat burdensome."
(R.736).
Petitioner did not file a supplemental brief following entry of the trial court's
findings, and therefore has not challenged this factual finding. Instead, petitioner relies
upon a variety of factual assertions contained in his opening brief which have no
citations to the record, and which are entirely speculative. See Brief of Appellant, pp.
12-19. These factual assertions are generally to the effect that Williams was unwilling
to spend more than a small amount of time on petitioner's case because he was not
adequately compensated for his work on the case, and made a much higher hourly rate
for his work for other clients, causing him to neglect petitioner's appeal for monetary
reasons. Petitioner asserts that Williams was forced to make afinancialdecision,

15

"advancing his own best interests" to the detriment of petitioner. Brief of Appellant,
pp. 18-19.
However, these factual assertions are not only made without any citations to the
record, they are contradicted by the only testimony on the issue.4 During Mr.
Williams' testimony, there was only one exchange regarding his compensation and the
time he spent on petitioner's appeal:
Q

[by petitioner's counsel]
And do you feel that your monetary compensation, contract
with the county, and your time constraints in any way
limited your representation of Mr. Tippett?

A

No.

Transcript of Hearing, p. 91 (R.636).5 Petitioner has failed to present any evidence
whatsoever that Williams' financial interests or time demands created a conflict of
interest. There is no evidence in the record as to the amount Williams was paid for his
4

Petitioner testified to his belief that Mr. Williams had a conflict, but based this
belief on the fact that Williams told him he was busy. Transcript of hearing, p.39
(R.689). Petitioner did not offer any further evidence to support his conclusion that a
conflict existed, and the trial court correctly relied upon the unrebutted testimony of
Mr. Williams on this issue (R.636). See also Id., p. 54 (R.674) (petitioner testified
that "it's hard to prove a conflict of interest because he knows what went on in his own
mind. I would have a hard time proving it. I am more, arguing more that he was
generally ineffective than anything.")
5

Petitioner's counsel went on to ask Williams whether he ever told petitioner
that the long trip from his home in Vernal to the prison in Gunnison prevented him
from spending adequate time on the case. Williams responded that he only told
petitioner that the distance to the prison would prevent him from visiting petitioner
"frequently or often." (R.636-37).
16

work on petitioner's case, what percentage of his income was generated by this case,
how his compensation for petitioner's case compares to his compensation for other
work, or the amount of time he spent on petitioner's case.
Williams denied that his compensation had any effect on his representation, and
the trial court's finding that there was no conflict of interest is fully supported by the
record.6
POINT III
PETITIONER'S APPELLATE COUNSEL ADEQUATELY RAISED
ALL APPROPRIATE ISSUES ON APPEAL
Again assuming arguendo that petitioner had a constitutional right to
representation of counsel on appeal from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea,
he would have had the right to effective assistance of counsel as a matter of due
process. Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Utah 1996). "The standard for
judging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as the standard for
judging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Under that standard, a defendant must
show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable

6

Petitioner re-argues this same point at pp. 45-47 of his brief, asserting that the
trial court erred in re-appointing Williams to represent him on appeal. "Mr. Tippett
notified both the trial court and the Court of Appeals of the fact that Allan Williams
was laboring under a conflict of interest due to the time constraints, inadequate
compensation, and duty to other clients." Id. However, as discussed above, the court
found that, in fact, no conflict existed.
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conduct and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant." Id. at 1153
(citations omitted).
The standard for determining whether appellate counsel has performed
adequately was recently addressed by the Tenth Circuit in Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904
(10th Cir. 1999):
When appellate counsel is alleged to be ineffective, we review with great
deference counsel's decision to omit an issue on appeal, and reverse only if
counsel fails to argue a "dead-bang winner." The Sixth Amendment
does not "require an attorney to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal."
Because the alleged deficiencies on appeal relate to trial counsel's conduct,
we review the claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on their
merits, along with the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Thus,
counsel frequently will "winnow out" weaker claims in order to focus
effectively on those more likely to prevail.
Id, 179 F.3d at 914 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Cook,
45 F.3d 388, 394 (10th Cir. 1995). The Tenth Circuit has defined the phrase 'dead bang
winner9 as "an issue which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would
have resulted in a reversal on appeal." Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 n. 13 (10th
Cir. 1995).
In this case, petitioner's attorney effectively argued that petitioner was not
properly informed of his possible sentence at the plea hearing, and was successful in
obtaining a reduction in petitioner's sentence. See Memorandum Decision (Addendum
A). Petitioner asserts that counsel should have raised a number of other issues in the
appeal, but part of appellate counsel's task is to choose from among possible issues so
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as not to distract the court from the most compelling arguments. Butterfield v. Cook,
817 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah App. 1991) (a<a brief that raises every colorable issue runs
the risk of burying good arguments* . . . 'Experienced advocates since time beyond
memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on
appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible or at most on a few key issues.'")
(quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 752 (1983) ("There can hardly be any
question about the importance of having the appellate advocate examine the record with
a view to selecting the most promising issues for review.")). See also Smith v.
Murray, All U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986) (tactical decision of appellate counsel not to raise
an issue, even one later shown to have been viable, did not constitute ineffective
assistance).
In any event, petitioner has not identified any viable appeal issue not raised by
his prior appellate counsel, let alone a 'dead-bang winner/ Petitioner identifies the
following as issues that should have been raised by his Mr. Williams in his appeal:
A. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Although Mr. Williams' brief raised
the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, petitioner now maintains that this issue was
inadequately briefed.
Specifically, petitioner asserts that Mr. Williams should have more clearly
argued the following alleged errors by trial counsel: (1) counsel waived the formal
reading of the information; (2) counsel did not object to the information for failure to
19

include victim names; (3) counsel did not assist the trial court in finding a factual basis
for the plea; (4) counsel did not object to the inaccurate description of the sentence
imposed for the firearm enhancement; and (5) counsel provided false information to
petitioner regarding the possibility that petitioner would be sent back to South Carolina
to serve his sentence.
Petitioner acknowledges that Mr. Williams raised the issue of the effectiveness
of his trial counsel in the brief, and asserts only that the discussion of these issues was
insufficient. Brief of Appellant, p. 21. However, in its ruling, this Court did not state
that it was refusing to consider any issue because of inadequate briefing; rather, the
ruling states that the Court found the arguments to be without merit. Memorandum
Decision, p.l n.l (Addendum A).
Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that the court of appeals did not properly
consider the issues because they were inadequately briefed, petitioner would not have
been able to show (and has still not shown) any prejudice.
First, petitioner has failed to show that the alleged omissions of his trial counsel
constituted deficient performance. Petitioner does not cite to any law for the
proposition that defense counsel's routine waiver of the reading of the information is
improper, that defense counsel has a duty to require that victim's names are included in
the information, or that defense counsel must ensure that the trial court finds a factual
basis for the plea. There is also no evidence in the record regarding any advice given
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by petitioner's trial counsel as to the likelihood that petitioner would be sent to South
Carolina to serve his sentence, or the accuracy of any information given him on this
issue.
In addition, even if these alleged acts were found to have occurred and to be
constitutionally deficient, petitioner has not asserted any prejudice resulting from them.
"Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel, he or she must show 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel1 s errors, he
[or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'"
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994) {quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59 (1985)).
Petitioner has not cited to any evidence to support the conclusion that these
issues would have changed his decision to plead guilty. Petitioner asserts in his brief
that his "main motivation" for entering a guilty plea was his belief that he would be
returned to South Carolina to serve his sentence. Brief of Appellant, p. 29. However,
this assertion is made without any citation to the record, and no such evidence was
offered to the trial court at the evidentiary hearing.
B. Jurisdictional defect in charging document. Petitioner argues that Mr.
Williams failed to argue that the information was insufficient to provide jurisdiction.
The adequacy of the information was briefed by Mr. Williams, and the argument was
found to be without merit by the court. See April 1, 1996 Brief of Appellant, p.8
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(Addendum C). Mr. Williams argued that the information was deficient for failure to
identify any victim, and that petitioner therefore did not have adequate notice of the
charges. Id.
Petitioner claims that Mr. Williams changed the substance of the argument
petitioner told him to assert, arguing that this issue should have been briefed as a lack
of jurisdiction rather than as a lack of notice. However, as Mr. Williams testified, his
characterization of the issue was a reasonable strategy decision. Mr. Williams felt that
since petitioner had clearly been misinformed of the possible length of his sentence, the
best argument on appeal was for withdrawal of the plea. Mr. Williams concluded that
it would be best to present the issue of the adequacy of the information as part of his
challenge to the plea, further strengthening that argument by asserting that petitioner's
plea was involuntary because he was not fully informed of the nature of the charges in
addition to the possible sentence. (R.658-59).
In considering a claim that counsel was deficient, counsel is given wide latitude
in making tactical decisions and a reviewing court should not question such decisions
unless there is no reasonable basis for them. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah
1996) (citing Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)); State v. Bryant, 965
P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998) ("we must be persuaded that there was a 'lack of any
conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions'") (quoting State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d
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688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)). Accordingly, counsel's treatment of the adequacy of the
information issue should be considered a reasonable tactical decision.
In any event, the jurisdictional argument based upon alleged deficiencies in the
information lacks merit. Petitioner asserts that Utah law requires that an information
identify victims by name in order to invoke the court's jurisdiction, citing State v.
Topham, 123 P.2d 388 (Utah 1912) and State v. Wilson, 143 P.2d 907 (Utah 1943).
To the extent that these cases support petitioner's jurisdictional argument, they are no
longer valid law. Wilson held that failure to state the name of a victim (if known) is a
fatal defect to a charging document, but this ruling was based upon a statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 105-11-1 (1943), which required that a victim be named. However, this
statute had been repealed at the time of petitioner's charge. Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-1
(1953), repealed by 1980 Utah Laws ch. 15, § 1; compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-4
(1982), enacted by 1980 Utah Laws ch.14, § 1 (current code of criminal procedure).
See also Briggs v. Wilcox, 404 P.2d 752, 755 (Wyo. 1965) (noting that Wilson is based
entirely upon Utah's statutory requirement that a victim be identified). At the time of
petitioner's guilty plea, and currently, Utah law does not require that an information
contain a victim's name in order to state an offense. Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, states the requirements for an information, and provides that:
An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by
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common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of
the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge.
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(b). There is thus no jurisdictional requirement that the information
state the name of the victim. See State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 104-05 (Utah 1988)
(indictment sufficient even though it merely repeated verbatim the broad, vague
language of the statute: "an information or indictment is legally sufficient even if it
consists of nothing more than an extremely summary statement of the charge that would
not provide the accused with sufficient particulars to prepare an adequate defense");
State v. Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1998) ("'What the defendant is entitled to is
an information which sufficiently informs him to enable him to understand the charge
against him and to prepare a defense. If it fulfills that requirement, it is sufficient. It
need not serve the purpose of discovery . . . ."') (quoting State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d
120, 127 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). Accordingly, the information was sufficient to state
an offense, and petitioner's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge
the information on a jurisdictional basis.
C. Failure to advise of consecutive nature of firearm enhancement.
Petitioner asserts that Mr. Williams failed to raise the issue of whether the trial court
adequately informed him at the time of his guilty plea that the firearm enhancement
would be imposed consecutively to his sentence for aggravated kidnaping. Brief of

24

Appellant, p. 34. There is no record support for this argument, and Mr. Williams was
not ineffective in not arguing it on appeal.
At the change of plea hearing, the trial court properly informed petitioner of his
possible sentence, including the nature of the firearm enhancement:
THE COURT: You understand that being a first degree felony carries with
it a sentence of five years to life in the Utah State Prison?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: It also carries with it a firearm enhancement penalty of not
less than one or up to five years on top of that. Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Transcript of plea hearing, p. 7 (R.341) (emphasis added). Petitioner asserts that the
phrase "on top of" is somehow ambiguous, but does not explain how a firearm
"enhancement" imposed "on top o f his other sentence could be anything but
consecutive. As the Court of Appeals noted, "[d]uring the taking of the plea, the trial
court informed defendant that a one to five year firearm enhancement was possible in
addition to the sentence for the underlying aggravated kidnaping charge."
Memorandum Decision, p. 2. (Addendum A)
Petitioner also claims that the trial court did not adequately explain the
indeterminate nature of the sentence. Brief of Appellant, p. 33. However, in accepting
a guilty plea, the trial court is only required to inform a defendant of the maximum
sentence possible and the effect of any minimum mandatory sentences applicable.
25

There is no requirement that the trial court explain the nature and practical effect of an
indeterminate sentence under Utah law. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(5). In addition,
petitioner does not cite to the record in support of his assertion that he did not, in fact,
understand Utah's indeterminate sentencing, and no evidence was offered on this point.
D. Failure to establish a factual basis for plea. Petitioner asserts that Mr.
Williams was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in accepting his
guilty plea without making an explicit finding of a factual basis for the plea. Brief of
Appellant, p. 35. However, petitioner did not make this argument in his motion to
withdraw his plea, and Mr. Williams was therefore not ineffective for failing to raise it
on appeal from the denial of that motion. See State v. Amoroso, 975 P.2d 505, 507
(Utah App. 1999) ("As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue raised
for the first time on appeal."). Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was not
made part of the record in this case. It is attached as Addendum F to the state's brief in
petitioner's prior appeal, Case No. 950280-CA. In a footnote in petitioner's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, petitioner alludes to the issue of whether there was
"insufficient evidence to support the guilty plea," but explicitly states that he is not
raising this claim in support of the motion, subject to a possible amendment which was
never sought. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, p. 4, n. 5.
Further, petitioner's argument is based upon an unsupported, unargued
assumption regarding the record in the underlying criminal case. Petitioner asserts that
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no factual basis for the plea exists, without any citation to the record, based solely on
the transcript of the change of plea hearing. Brief of Appellant, p. 35. However,
when determining whether there is a factual basis for a plea, the court must review the
entire record of the case to determine if a factual basis can be found, regardless of
whether that evidence was examined by the trial court during the plea hearing. In State
v. Stilling, 856 P2d 666, 674 (Utah App. 1993), the court held that although a factual
basis for the plea must be found in the record, that record includes the entire record
before the court.
The record we examine to determine the presence of a factual basis for
Stilling's plea consists of the entire record before us on appeal, which
includes all portions of the trial court record certified on appeal.
Although Stilling has argued that the record as a whole should be limited
to the plea hearing proceedings, we include in our review other portions
of the trial court record and the affidavit of Stilling's trial counsel.
Id. at 674.7 Likewise, in State v. Willett, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992), the trial court
failed to address the existence of a factual basis at the plea hearing, and the supreme
court found nothing in the record of the plea hearing to support a finding that a factual
basis existed for the plea. Id. at 861. However, in order to consider whether a factual
basis did, in fact, exist, the court took judicial notice of a partial preliminary hearing
transcript. Although the court found that the partial transcript available to it did not

7

As was the case in Stilling, at the time of petitioner's plea, Rule 11, Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, did not require that the trial court find a factual basis for the
plea at the plea hearing itself. See Id., 856 P.2d at 673 n. 6.
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provide sufficient evidence of an adequate factual basis, it remanded the case to the trial
court "to permit the State an opportunity to produce a proper transcript of the
preliminary hearing or to otherwise prove what occurred there." Willett, 842 P.2d at
863.
Petitioner asserts on appeal, without reference to the record, that there is no
factual basis in that record, but failed to offer any proof of this assertion to the trial
court in this case. The entire underlying criminal trial record must be reviewed to
determine the existence of a factual basis, and that record was never submitted to the
trial court in this case. Thus, although petitioner's brief alleges that the criminal trial
record does not contain a factual basis, only a portion of that record- the change of plea
hearing-was admitted below or included in the record on appeal. See State v. Penman,
964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) ("'When a defendant predicates error to [an
appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an
adequate record/") (quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982))
Accordingly, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that Mr. Williams was
ineffective in failing to argue this issue in the original appeal: petitioner did not himself
raise it in his motion, the denial of which was the subject of the appeal, and the record
in this case does not support petitioner's claim that a factual basis did not exist
anywhere in the criminal trial record.
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E. Failure to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Petitioner
argues that Mr. Williams was ineffective because he violated Rules 1.2 and 1.4, Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct. Brief of Appellant, pp. 36-41.
With regard to Rule 1.2, Scope of Representation, petitioner asserts that Mr.
Williams omitted or changed the nature of several arguments without petitioner's
permission. Brief of Appellant, p.37. However, petitioner's quotation of the rule in
his brief omits with ellipses the operative language for representation of a criminal
defendant:
Rule 1.2. Scope of representation.
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives
of representation, subject to paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer
shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement
of a matter. In a criminal case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2 (emphasis added). Thus, in a criminal case,
counsel is only obligated to abide by his client's decisions on specified matters, which
do not include the choice of issues to present on appeal. It is well established that an
attorney in a criminal case retains the ability to choose which arguments to pursue on
appeal, even over the objections of his client. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983) (defendant does not have the right to compel appointed counsel to make even
non-frivolous arguments "if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not
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to present those points"). Accordingly, the issue is not whether Mr. Williams made or
did not make arguments contrary to petitioner's wishes; rather, the court must
determine whether Williams' performance was adequate under constitutional standards.
Butterfield, 817 P.2d at 337.
Petitioner also cites to Rule 1.4, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which
requires that a lawyer keep his client informed about the status of the case and allow the
client to make reasonably informed decisions. Petitioner asserts that Mr. Williams
violated this rule, but does not cite to the record for any facts to support this argument.
Brief of Appellant, p. 39. In addition, the trial court explicitly rejected this allegation,
finding that "Mr. Williams effectively communicated and in fact adequately complied
with Tippett's request for communication to the extent that would be required of
Counsel generally practicing in the area of Criminal Appeals and within the standard of
practice recognized as effective." (R.736). This finding of fact is not challenged on
appeal.
F. Failure to petition for rehearing. Petitioner asserts that Mr. Williams was
ineffective in failing to seek a rehearing following the court of appeal's decision.
Petitioner argues that rehearing was appropriate because in finding that the trial court
failed to accurately describe the possible length of the sentencing enhancement, the
court of appeals erred in failing to also find that petitioner was not informed of the fact
that the enhancement would be consecutive to his kidnaping sentence. Brief of
30

Appellant, p.42. However, as petitioner has pointed out, Mr. Williams did not make
this argument to the court of appeals in the first place, so there would not have been
any basis for a rehearing request. See Utah R. App. P. 35 ("The petition shall state
with particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has
overlooked or misapprehended . . . " ) . In any event, this argument is without merit.
See supra, Point III.C.8
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the trial court's denial of this petition should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ( 5 day of January, 2000.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KEITO WILSON
Assistant Attorney General

8

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in failing to enter findings of fact
pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Brief of Appellant, pp. 11,
47-48. However, this case was not remanded for a hearing under Rule 23B, which
applies only to direct criminal appeals, and not to this civil post-conviction proceeding.
Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) ("A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court
to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the
appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."). In any
event, after petitioner's brief was filed, this matter was remanded to the trial court for
entry of findings. See September 14, 1999 Order Granting Motion to Remand and to
Stay Briefing; Ruling (R.735).
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ORME, Presiding Judge:
Defendant's main contention on appeal is that the trial
court violated Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) by failing to inform him,
before he entered his guilty plea, of the maximum additional
sentence that could be imposed upon him by reason of the firearm
enhancement.l
In State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-14 (Utah 1987), our
Supreme Court held that strict compliance with the constitutional
and procedural requirements for the taking of a guilty plea was
required before such a plea could be taken. However, pleas taken
before Gibbons2 are upheld so long as the record as a whole
demonstrates "substantial compliance" with Rule 11 of the Utah
1. Although defendant raises additional arguments, they are
without merit and we decline to address them further. See, e.g..
state v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (w[T]his Court
need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument,
issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal.").
2. Gibbons was a clear break with the Supreme Court's rulings in
previous cases dealing with the validity of guilty pleas and,
therefore, is not applied retroactively. State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d
1119, 1123 (Utah 1991).

Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution. Willett v.
Bames, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1992); State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d
1119, 1123-24 (Utah 1991). In this case, defendant's plea was
taken prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Gibbons and,
therefore, must be evaluated under the substantial compliance
test.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally
ill, and may not accept the plea until the
court has found:

(5) the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum
sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences . . . •
During the taking of the plea, the trial court informed defendant
that a one to five year firearm enhancement was possible in
addition to the sentence for the underlying aggravated kidnaping
charge. Defendant then entered his plea of guilty. However, at
defendant's sentencing, following the receipt of a presentence
report indicating five prior convictions for armed robbery, the
court enhanced defendant's minimum mandatory term of fifteen
years to life with a consecutive term of five to ten years for
his use of a firearm.3 Because the trial court failed to inform
defendant of the maximum sentence that could have been imposed
upon him by reason of the firearm enhancement, the trial court
was not in substantial compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 11 on
this point.
Nonetheless, it is not necessary that defendant be allowed
to withdraw his guilty plea since the problem is limited to the
3. Of course, at the time the plea was taken, the trial court
did not know of the additional convictions. Nonetheless, the
point could have been adequately covered by explaining the
enhancement scheme to defendant and emphasizing that the
enhancement to be ultimately imposed would depend on the number
and nature of his prior convictions, but could be as much as ten
years. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1996).

9S0280-CA

2

firearm enhancement. At the invitation of the State, we modify
defendant's sentence by reducing the firearm enhancement to that
which had been explained to him, namely, not less than one year
nor more than five years. J£SL£ State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1211
(Utah 1993)(holding that appellate courts have the authority to
modify criminal judgments on appeal). The order appealed from is
otherwise affirmed.
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EP\ V : ?cco

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH

SEP 2 * «99
STATE OF UTAH

COURT OF APPEA LS

-qWJtcfl

WAYNE S. TIPPETT,
Petitioner,

RULING

Case No: 970800314

vs.
FRED VANDERVEUR,
Respondent,

This matter is again before the Court on Remand for the entry on Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Support of the Court's February 8,1999 denial
of Appellant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
The Court has carefully reviewed the transcript of the proceedings and will
note that at the conclusion of the hearing on September 23rd, 1998 the Court
requested Counsel to file Summary Memoranda giving their respective versions
of what the evidence showed and the appropriate law. The Court has carefully
reviewed the respective Memoranda and at the time of it's prior ruling simply
intended to incorporate by reference the view of the record and the facts as set
forth in the Respondent's Memorandum.
The Court upon remand will now enter it's own Findings of Fact:
1. It would appear from the record that Counsel Williams visited with the
Plaintiff and Appellant, Mr. Tippett at the Gunnison Prison on two
occasions.
2. That although relations became somewhat strained they were later
ironed out by the testimony in the record.
3. That Attorney Williams and Defendant Tippett corresponded regularly
and Williams included salient points in the brief before the Court
pursuant to his own determination of what would be effective and also
in a second brief the sub-issues requested by Mr. Tippett.
4. The Court has not been able to deduce from the transcript or any

testimony contained therein any apparent conflict of interest. The only
suggestion that there was a conflict would be Mr. Williams statement
that the trip from Vernal to Gunnison was extremely long and somewhat
burdensome.
5. The Court has no additional evidence in the record to determine an
actual conflict or that the conflict existed and the burden would be on
Tippett to demonstrate a conflict.
6. The Court finds by preponderance of the evidence in the record that Mr.
Williams effectively communicated and in fact adequately complied with
Tippett's request for communication to the extent that would be
required of Counsel generally practicing in the area of Criminal Appeals
and within the standard of practice recognized as effective.
7. After reviewing the trial record Attorney Williams briefed every issue he
determined viable. In addition to the specific findings made and entered
by the Court, the Court will incorporate the factual basis and references
to the transcript found in the State's Memoranda and support the
argument that Tippetts was given and Williams offered effective
assistance. The State's Memoranda is incorporated by reference in it's
entirety.
From the forgoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters the
following Conclusions of Law.
1. From the facts adduced in the record the Petitioner has failed to carry
the burden by preponderance of the evidence that Williams acts or
omissions fell outside the range of professionally competent assistance
and that William's deficient performance, if any, prejudiced the outcome of
the proceeding. The Trial Court will exercise it's sound discretion in
leaving the lawyer on board even where the defendant voices some
dissatisfaction with Court appointed Counsel where there are no facts in
the record to establish that the animosity between Tippets and Williams
resulted in such a deterioration of the attorney client relationship that the
right to the effective assistance of counsel was imperiled or that there was
a complete breakdown in communication.
This Court will conclude that Petitioner's Request for Post-Conviction
Relief will be denied and the Petition will be Dismissed with Prejudice.

Dated this

n
\
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day of Sept

Ige John R. Anderson
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I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, or
hand delivered to the following parties on the ^CX day of September, 1999.
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Addendum C

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee
CASE NO.

vs.

95-0280

Priority No. 2

WAYNE S. TIPPETT,
Defendant/Appellant.

,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78-2-3 (i).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did

the

trial

court

abuse

its

discretion

in

denying

Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea?
The

Court

should

review

this

case

using

an

"abuse

of

discretion" standard, State vs. Mildenhall, 787 P. 2d 744, (Utah,
1987) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This case is governed in part by Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which was at the time of the plea codified as
Title 77, Chapter 35, Section 11(e), Utah Code Annotated.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of the Eighth District Court's denial of a
Motion

to

Withdraw

Guilty

Plea

submitted

appellant on the 9th day of June, 1994.

by

the

defendant/

The motion was denied by

two separate rulings; one dated June 29, 1994 and a supplementary
ruling dated July 12, 1994.
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
The Defendant/Appellant

was charged in the Eighth District

Court for Uintah County, State of Utah on the 18th of February,
1986 with

two counts

of Aggravated

Section 76-5-302 Utah Code Annotated.

Kidnapping

in violation

of

Each count also provided a

Firearms Enhancement Provision pursuant to Section 76-3-203 Utah
Code.

On February 26, 1986 the Defendant/Appellant plead guilty

to Count One of the Information.
dismissed.

Count Two of the information was

The record does not reveal that any affidavit was used

to assist the court in an explanation of Defendant/Appellant's Rule
11(e) rights at the time of plea.

After

a colloquy with the

Honorable Richard Davidson, the court accepted the guilty plea.
The matter came before the court for sentencing on the 26th day of
March, 1986, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding.

The Defendant/

Appellant was sentenced to a minimum mandatory sentence at the Utah
State

Prison

of

15

years

to

life

with

a

firearm

enhancement

requiring an additional 5 to 10 years to be served consecutively
2

with the 15 years to life sentence.

On May 20, 1987 at the request

of the Chairman of the Board of Pardons, the court reviewed the
Defendant/Appellant's sentence.

The court, the Honorable Dennis

Draney presiding, re-affirmed the sentence originally imposed.
June 9,

On

1994, Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

before the Eighth District Court.

The plea was defective in that

the elements of the offense were not explained to Defendant/
Appellant.

It was further defective in that the trial court did

not give the Defendant/Appellant the proper maximum punishment, nor
explain the nature of the Utah indeterminative sentencing.

Counsel

for the Defendant/Appellant's performance was inadequate in that
he did not explain any of the required Pre-requisites to a valid
plea.

The information was defective in that it did not adequately

identify any victim of the alleged crime.

Counsel's performance

was also deficient in that he also did pursue any information to
cure

the

defective

information.

All

the

prior

judges

having

retired, resigned, or being deceased, the case was re-assigned to
the Honorable John R. Anderson.

Judge Anderson issued a summary

ruling to the motion to dismiss, the State having given no response
to the motion.

That ruling, dated June 29, 1994 denied all aspects

of Defendant's

Motion

to Withdraw Guilty

Plea excepting

for a

response by the State the issue of an inadequate explanation of
the firearms enhancement.
on

July

12,

1994

and

After considering the State's response,

giving

the
3

Defendant

no

opportunity

to

consider
denying

the State's

response, Judge Anderson

the Defendant's

Motion to Withdraw

issued a ruling

Guilty Plea

in its

entirety stating that the court had substantially complied with the
requirements of Rule 11(e).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
is in error.

The court made no findings that the appellant waived

his right to self incrimination.

The court made no findings that

the appellant understood the nature and elements of the crime and
that

his

plea

admitted

each

and

every

element.

The

court

incorrectly advised the defendant as to the maximum sentence which
could be imposed.

The information was deficient in that it did not

advise the Defendant/Appellant

of the identity

of the victims.

Defendant/Appellant was deprived of key elements of effective of
counsel

in

that

no

discovery

was

requested,

discussed

with

Defendant/Appellant, nor were there any attempts to explain the
sentencing, or cure the defective information.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE IT FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH RULE 11(e) OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect
at the time appellant made his guilty plea as codified in 77-3511(e) provided as follows:
The court . . . shall not accept a (plea of guilty) until the
4

court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel
he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2)

That the plea is voluntarily made;

(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all
of those rights;
(4)
That the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea;
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt;
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5)
That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of
the imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6)
Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, what
agreement has been reached.
The record of the entry of pleas is very limited.

From the

record, it appears that no plea affidavit was used, therefore the
court can only determine the trial court's compliance with rule
11(e) based on the oral representations made in open court.
That record is bereft of any discussion with the appellant on
several

critical

points

included

in

the

rule.

There

is

no

discussion whatsoever with the appellant concerning his right
against compulsory self incrimination as required by subsection (3)
of the rule.

There is no discussion of the nature and elements of

the offense of aggravated kidnapping with a firearms enhancement
as required by Subsection 4 of the rule.
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There is no discussion

or record that

the guilty plea was an admission

to each of the

elements of the alleged crime as required by subsection 4 (Record,
pp 4-7).
The record also reveals that the trial judge affirmative misrepresented to the appellant the maximum sentence possible as a
result of the plea.

Subsection 5 of the rule required a finding

that

understands

the

defendant

possible sentence.

both

the

minimum

and

maximum

At line 12, page 7 of the record, the trial

judge informed the appellant that a one to five year enhancement
was possible in addition to the five years to life he originally
explained.

No correction of that error was made.

The appellant

was sentenced to a five to ten year firearm enhancement in direct
contradiction to what had been explained.
The standard of review as previously stated is that of an
"abuse of discretionM by the court.

The companion cases of Warner

vs. Morris, 709 P. 2d 309 (Utah, 1985) and Brooks vs. Morris, 709
P. 2d 310, (Utah, 1985), established the standard by which a trial
court

accepts

guilty pleas.

The

Supreme

Court

stated

that a

failure of to advise a defendant of his rights concerning selfincrimination was not alone sufficient to invalidate a guilty plea
provided

that

the

record

as

a whole

showed

requirements were substantially complied with.

that

the

rule 11

Subsequently the

Supreme Court in State vs. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah, 1987)
replaced

the

"substantial

compliance" standard.

compliance"

rule

with

a

"strict

It has been ruled that the Gibbons rule was

not retroactive, however the concepts set forth in Gibbons are
6

useful.

In Gibbons
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failures
the Warner
MI

< ne

I III
record
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even
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i i

m

OM-'IH

cases

IM i o n was
MIS

more

complete that here.

Here as well, we have not only a failure to

inform appellant of the maximum sentence, but a misrepresentation
by the court as to the maximum sentence.

WHen coupled with the

failure to discuss the elements of the offense, the combination is
fatal to the trial court's ruling that the requirements had been
substantially complied with.

Finally, even though there was some

discussion of some of the RUle 11 requirements at the time the plea
was

entered,

no

knowingly made.

findings

were

made

except

that

the

plea

was

(Record p 8 ) .
POINT II

THE PLEA WAS IMPROPERLY TAKEN BECAUSE THE INFORMATION
DID NOT ADEQUATELY INFORM THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT OF THE
NATURE OF THE CHARGES.
The information to which the Defendant/Appellant alleges as
follows:
Count : AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, in violation Section
76-5-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, on or
about February 17, 1986, in Uintah County, Utah, a First
Degree Felony;
The said defendant at the time and place aforesaid
did intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law
and against the will of the victim, by any means and in
any manner, seized, confined, detained, or transported
the victim with intent:
a. To hold for ransom or reward, or as shield
of hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in
particular conduct; or
b.
To facilitate the commission, attempted
commission, or flight after commission or attempted
commission of felony; or
c. To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize
the victim or another. . . .
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and that the filing of a bill of particulars is normally one of the
proper remedies to an inadequate information, that statement only
illustrates another issue which will be addressed later in this
matter, that is, the ineffective assistance of counsel.
The lack of identity of the victims illustrates again the
inadequacy of the inquiry at the time of the taking of his plea.
It has

already

been

stated

that

the

record

is bereft

discussion of the elements of the offense charged.

of any

Because no bill

of particulars was filed, the Defendant/Appellant did not have a
more specific information that the original one which was filed.
There is no indication that any request for discovery was ever
filed nor that any discovery was given to the defendant.

All of

these things which might have had some curative effect upon the
lack of the notice in the information did not occur.

The failure

to explain the elements of the crime, and to get a factual basis
for the plea become even worse.
POINT 3
THE INADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL FURTHER IMPAIRED
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE PROCEEDINGS
WHEN THE GUILTY PLEA WAS TAKEN.
The performance of defense counsel in adequately representing
his

client

is

always

a difficult

representation is not on the record.
makes

it difficult

assistance
constitutes

issue

ineffective

assistance

that

much

of

any

The attorney client privilege

for an attorney

accusations, nevertheless

in

to respond

to

ineffective

there is guidance on what
of counsel.

In

State

v.

Moritzsky, 771 P 2d. 689 (Utah App. 1989), Defense attorney Lance
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favorable to defendant/appellant than his plea is difficult.

It

must be noted however that since the defendant/appellant received
the maximum sentence allowed by law for one count of aggravated
kidnapping,

and

the

statutory

preference

was

for

concurrent

sentences at the time, it is hard to say that no better result
could have been obtained for the Defendant.
CONCLUSION
The record

in this case shows affirmative mistakes by the

court and counsel in the taking of appellant's plea.
show

strict

approaching

compliance,
the

required

It does not

substantial

compliance,

or

standard.

The

was

process

anything

complicated by defense counsel's ineffective performance
process of the plea.

further
in the

Since the information was defective in notice

to the defendant, the problem grew even worse.

Appellant hereby

prays that the court reverse the trial court's denial of his Motion
to

Withdraw

Guilty

Plea

and

remand

the

case

for

proceedings.
DATED this

( r ^ day of

ApvT^ (

, 1996.

Alan M. Williams
Attorney for Appellant
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Addendum D

UTAH RULES <H fRIMiN/'H llidni MHIKh

RUJ

osecution of public offenses,

(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense
has been committed.
(b) An indictment or information, shall charge the offense for which the
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by
common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the
offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An information
may contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out
probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things
as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged
unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities,
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by
any name or description by which they are generally known or by which they
may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning
such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper lan^im^ h i i i
indictment or information.
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at
any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an
indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such
particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the
same set of facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to
enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for
a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten
days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may,
on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars
may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as
justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall
be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the
essential elements of the particular offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name
contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception,
o
contained in the statute creating or defining the offense.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual
meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal
meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather tit an the conjunctiv e shall not in * alidate the
indictment or information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information
was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall
not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on
application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall,
except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he
proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to
appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel.
Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural
person.

